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In this paper, we aim to answer two questions. First, whether firms manipulate reported earnings via pension assumptions when facing mandatory contributions. Second, whether firms alter their earnings management behavior when the Financial Accounting Standard Board (FASB) mandates disclosure of pension asset composition and a description of investment strategy under SFAS 132R.

Our basic approach is to run linear regressions of firm-year assumed returns on the log of pension sensitivity measures, controlling for current and lagged actual returns from pension assets, fiscal year dummies and industry dummies. The larger the pension sensitivity ratios, the stronger the effects from inflated ERRs on reported earnings. We confirm the early results that the regression slopes are positive and highly significant. We construct an indicator variable DMC to capture the mandatory contributions firms face and another indicator variable D132R to capture the effect of SFAS 132R. DMC takes the value of one for fiscal years during which an acquisition takes place and zero otherwise. D132R takes the value of one for fiscal years after December 15, 2003 and zero otherwise.

Our sample covers the period from June 1992 to December 2017. Our key results are as follows. The estimated coefficient (t-statistic) on DMC is 0.308 (6.87). Firms facing mandatory contributions tend to set ERRs at an average 0.308% higher. The estimated coefficient (t-statistic) on D132R is −2.190 (−13.70). The new disclosure requirement under SFAS 132R constrains all firms to set ERRs at an average 2.190% lower. The estimate (t-statistic) on the interactive term DMA×D132R is −0.237 (−3.29). When mandatory contributions happen during the post-SFAS 132R period, firms tend to set ERRs at 0.237% lower than they would do otherwise in the pre-SFAS 132R period.

When firms face mandatory contributions, typically firm experience negative stock market returns. We examine whether managers manage earnings to mitigate such negative impact. We find that firms inflate assumed returns on pension assets to boost their reported earnings when facing mandatory contributions. We also find that managers alter earnings management behavior, in the case of mandatory contributions, following the introduction of new pension disclosure standards under SFAS 132R that become effective on December 15, 2003. Under the new SFAS 132R requirement, firms need to disclose asset allocation and describe investment strategies. This imposes restrictions on managers' discretion in making ERR assumptions, since now the composition of pension assets is a key determinant of the assumed expected rate of return on pension assets. Firms need to justify their ERRs with their asset allocations.

To address the safety concerns generated by truck crashes occurred in big cities, this paper analyzes the zip code tabulation area (ZCTA)-based truck crash frequency across four temporal intervals – morning (6:00–10:00), mid-day (10:00–15:00), afternoon (15:00–19:00), and night (19:00–6:00) in New York City in 2010. A multivariate conditional autoregressive count model is used to recognize both spatial and temporal dependences. The results prove the presence of spatial and temporal dependencies for truck crashes that occurred in neighboring areas. Built environment attributes such as various types of business establishment density and traffic volume for different types of vehicles, which are important factors to consider for crashes occurred in an urban setting, are also examined in the study.

The purpose of this paper is, from a resource accumulation and resource allocation perspective, to examine the variant effects of government subsidies among firms with varying levels of market power and to test how industry competition moderates the relationship between market power and allocative efficiency of government subsidies.

This study explores the relationship between government subsidies and firm performance from a resource-based view. The authors study the moderating role of market power and three-way interaction between subsidy, market power and industry competition on firm performance. The authors test their hypotheses using a sample of Chinese A-share manufacturing firms from 2006–2019. The authors apply firm-level panel data regressions and conduct a series of robustness tests. The marginal effect of market power and industry competition is explored via three-way moderator effect models.

This study finds that government subsidies are negatively related to firm performance. Market power, on average, strengthens the negative effect of government subsidies on performance, but such a reinforcement effect is neutralized when industry competition is intense. Government subsidies are least efficiently used when firms have market power and industry competition is low. In addition, the authors use different forms of firm performance and a various of robustness tests to verify their assumptions.

This paper contributes to the literature as follows. First, the authors look into subsidy–performance problem from the perspective of the resource-based view and contribute to explaining and mitigating the divergence of current findings on the subsidy–performance relationship. Second, the authors introduce market power and industry competition as moderators to study how resource allocative efficiency affects the subsidy–performance relationship. Third, the authors propose that managerial incentives have played an important role in the allocation of government subsidies, which enriches management practices.

The purpose of this paper is to explore the extent to which Chinese classical virtues act as a restraint on consumerist hedonic values and the associated priority on profit maximisation by managers.

The paper is based on a literature review and adopts a reflective approach to the topic.

The paper considers how Chinese classical virtues are related to contemporary relational or indigenous values and how a social tension is created between these values and the hedonic values now present in Chinese urban society. Implications for management and management education are reviewed in the light of this tension.

The social unrest created by the privatisation of SOEs can be mitigated by the promotion of management education sensitised to the cultural norms and expectations of the Chinese people in relation to the role and responsibilities of managers. The Junzi (gentleman‐leader) archetype and the virtues of ren‐yi‐li are offered as exemplary features of a management seeking to balance social responsibility with profitability.

The paper highlights the social turbulence created by the advent of market economics in China and the concomitant rise of consumerism and the privatisation of state‐owned enterprises.